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I graduated from law school in 1975. While in law school, I took
federal courts and as much constitutional law as I could, and I wrote a
student note on a federal courts topic. But when I graduated, I had
never heard of the Eleventh Amendment. I knew the Amendment
must exist because I had studied the Fourteenth Amendment, and
even the Thirteenth. But I knew as little about the Eleventh Amend-
ment as about the Twelfth. (I still know nothing about the Twelfth.)
There was very little academic writing on the Eleventh Amend-
ment in the mid-1970s. Professor Jacobs published a historical study
in 1972; 1 Professor Nowak published an article in 1975;2 and Professor
Tribe published an article in 1976.3 Professor Field did not publish
her prescient articles on the Amendment until 1978.4 When I was a
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; Richard W.
Jennings, Jr., Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, School of
Law (Boalt Hall).
This Article is a slightly expanded version of a talk delivered to the Federal
Courts Section of the Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in
January of 2000. I would like to thank my law clerks, Matti Fromson, Freya
McCamant, Kim Sayers-Fay, and Sherri Sokeland, for their very helpful comments and
editing suggestions.
1 See CLYDE EDwARD JAcOBs, TiH ELvFNTH AmENDMENT AND SovEREIGN ImmU-
NrrY (1972).
2 See John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action
Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75
COLuM. L. REv. 1413 (1975).
3 See Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 RAuv. L. REv.
682 (1976).
4 See Martha Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Part One]; Martha Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congressional Imposition
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law clerk during October Term of 1976, I learned for the first time
that Justice Brennan had a "position" on the Eleventh Amendment.5
The position seemed sensible (if a little odd) to me at the time, but I
was not sure how much practical importance it had. Edelman v. Jor-
dan§ had been decided in the spring of 1974, and Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer7
in the spring of 1976, but their import was not apparent, at least not
to me.
That time is scarcely imaginable now. There has been an ava-
lanche of excellent academic writing on the Eleventh Amendment
since then, much of it by the contributors to this Symposium. Fur-
ther, although the Amendment was ratified over two hundred years
ago, the Supreme Court has decided more Eleventh Amendment
cases in the last twenty-five years than in the entire period before that.
Some, but by no means all, of the judicial landmarks since 1976 have
been Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman8 in 1984, holding
that the Ex parte Young 9 fiction did not permit injunctions to enforce
state law;0justice Brennan's dissent in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scan-
lon'I in 1985, advancing for the first time in a judicial opinion what
has come to be known as the "diversity explanation"; 12 Welch v. Texas
Department of Highways & Public Transportation13 in 1987, holding that
the Jones Act did not clearly indicate a congressional intent to subject
the states to provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act;' 4 Penn-
sylvania v. Union Gas Co.' 5 in 1989, holding that Congress has the
power under the Commerce Clause to abrogate the protection of the
Eleventh Amendment; Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commis-
sion16 in 1991, holding that the Federal Employers' Liability Act cre-
ates a cause of action against a state in state court but not in federal
court; Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatakl7 in 1991, holding that the
of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Congressional
Imposition].
5 See Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
6 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
7 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
8 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
9 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
10 See Pennhurst State Sch., 465 U.S. at 106.
11 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
12 See id. at 247 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
13 483 U.S. 468 (1987).
14 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
15 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
16 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
17 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
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Eleventh Amendment bars an Indian tribe from suing a state; Seminole
Tribe v. Florida18 in 1996, overruling Union Gas and holding that Con-
gress does not, after all, have the power under the Commerce Clause
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment; and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribel9 in 1997, holding that an Indian tribe is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment from seeking injunctive relief in federal court in a suit to
establish title to land.
Last Term, the Supreme Court decided three more Eleventh
Amendment cases: F/orida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board
v. College Savings Bank,20 holding that the federal Patent and Plant Va-
riety Protection Remedy Clarification Act2' was passed under the
Commerce and Patent Clauses rather than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and that it does not abrogate the protection of the Eleventh
Amendment; College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educa-
tion Expense Board,22 holding that the federal Trademark Remedy Clar-
ification Act 23 was not "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment and does not abrogate the protection of the
Eleventh Amendment; and Alden v. Maine,24 following Professor Wz-
quez's recommendation 25 and holding that Congress does not have
any greater power to subject a state to suit under federal law in state
court than in federal court, and that the Eleventh Amendment bars
suit in state court under the Fair Labor Standards Act.2 6 This Term,
the Court has already decided Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,27 hold-
ing that the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196728
is not "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel.
Stevens,29 in which the Court is asked to decide whether the Eleventh
Amendment protects a state against a suit brought by a private individ-
18 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
19 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
20 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
21 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(h), 296 (1994).
22 119 S. Ct. 2219 (1999).
23 Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.c.).
24 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
25 Carlos Manuel Vzquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE LJ.
1283 (1997).
26 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
27 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
28 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
29 119 S. Ct. 2391 (1999) (granting cert. from United States ex rel. Stevens v. Ver-
mont Agency of Natural Resources, 162 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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ual on behalf of the United States under the federal qui tam statute,
still awaits decision.
I will try to answer three questions today: First, why now? What
has changed to bring the Amendment, for the first time in its history,
to center stage of American constitutional development? Second,
what is the current state of the law? Third, what is the Court's unfin-
ished business?
I. WHY Now?
The three developments most responsible for the recent emer-
gence of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence are, first, the adoption
of the Fourteenth Amendment after the Civil War; second, the War-
ren Court revolution, most clearly exemplified by Brown v. Board of
Education;30 and third, the expansion of federal statutory obligations
imposed on the states, both in cooperative and not-so-cooperative
federalism.
First, the Fourteenth Amendment imposed substantial federal
constitutional obligations directly on the states. As we know, those
obligations were largely ignored for several decades, and when first
enforced at the end of the nineteenth century, they took the form of
substantive due process restrictions on the ability of the states to pass
economic legislation. Judge Friendly has reminded us that because of
this earlier meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, Ex parte Young,
the primary mechanism of enforcing the obligations of the Four-
teenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, was the "bate noir of the
liberals" in the 1920s. 31 But whether used to curb Progressive eco-
nomic legislation of the states in the early years of the century or to
protect individual rights against abuses by the states in the second half
of the century, the Fourteenth Amendment laid the foundation for
the exercise of federal judicial power against the states.
Second, Brown marked the beginning of the Warren Court's vig-
orous expansion of equal protection and due process protections for
individuals against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fur-
ther, and probably more important for our purposes, Brown set the
stage for remedial law to come-for the routine enforcement of af-
firmative injunctions against state actors under Ex parte Young. In
their earlier incarnation, Ex parte Young injunctions were classic nega-
tive injunctions, merely ordering state officers to cease illegal activity.
In their late twentieth-century incarnation-in school busing, prison
reform, and other cases-Ex parte Young injunctions have typically
30 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31 HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, FEDERALJURISDICION: A GENERAL VIEW 3 n.7 (1973).
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been affirmative injunctions, ordering state officers to perform spe-
cific acts.3 2 Affirmative injunctions are, if understood in terms of com-
mon law and equitable doctrines, the most intrusive form of relief.
There is an obvious irony in the fact that such injunctions are permit-
ted under current Eleventh Amendment doctrine while damages are
forbidden, for affirmative injunctions were traditionally seen as more
intrusive than damages at law and negative injunctions in equity. In-
deed, because of the intrusiveness of affirmative injunctions, there
may be some danger to the continuation of an unqualified Ex parte
Young principle under the current Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Third, the federal government during the twentieth century has
increasingly sought to regulate the states under federal statutes.
Some, such as the Federal Employers' Liability Act3 3 and the federal
Fair Labor Standards Act,34 have been on the books for many years.
Others, such as the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)3 5 and the federal pro-
gram of Supplemental Security Income for Aged, Blind, and Dis-
abled,36 have either been recently enacted or recently amended. As I
will argue in a moment, the most important part of the Court's unfin-
ished business is to arrive at a proper understanding of the place of
such statutes in the federal structure.
The combination of these three factors has produced an enor-
mous number of decisions as the Supreme Court has tried to sort out
the proper relationships between the federal and state governments,
between state and local governments, between federal and state
courts, between federal and state law, between federal constitutional
and federal statutory law, between Article-I-based and Fourteenth-
32 Sometimes the affirmative injunctions are straightforward orders to do specific
things in accordance with federal law in the future. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Many lower court prison reform cases also
support this proposition. Occasionally, they are orders to act affirmatively in the fu-
ture to cure constitutional violations that occurred in the past. See, e.g., Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
33 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994). For cases involving this statute, see Hilton v. South
Carolina Public Railway Commission, 502 U.S. 197 (1991), Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways & Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 469 (1987), Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377
U.S. 184 (1964), and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
34 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994). For cases involving this statute, see Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct 2240 (1999), Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469
U.S. 528 (1985), and National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
35 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), for a case involving this statute.
36 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S.
651 (1974), for a case involving this statute.
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Amendment-based law, between governmental and private sectors,
and among various kinds of judicial remedies. As is clear from the
three decisions last Term, from the cases on the calendar this Term,
and from the cases now being decided in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court is still sorting out these relationships.
II. WHERE ARE WE?
The actual text of the Eleventh Amendment, of course, says very
little. Those who subscribe to the "diversity explanation" believe that
the Amendment does no more than require a narrow construction of
the state-citizen diversity clause of Article III, Section 2; under this
reading, the Amendment bars nothing, and state sovereign immunity
must be found elsewhere in the Constitution.37 Those who, on the
other hand, subscribe to a "prohibition theory" believe that the text of
the Amendment prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction; under this
reading, the Amendment bars federal court jurisdiction, but only
when an out-of-state or foreign citizen sues a state in law or equity.38
Under either reading of the Amendment, the text does not bar a suit
by any plaintiff except an out-of-state or foreign citizen, does not bar a
suit not brought in law or equity, and does not bar any suit brought in
state court.
Under current law, however, the bar is extremely broad. The
Amendment (or the sovereign immunity principle for which it stands)
bars suit against states brought not only by out-of-state and foreign
individuals, but also by in-state individuals, 39 by Indian tribes,40 and by
37 For an adumbration of the diversity explanation, see Field, Part One, supra note
4, and Field, Congressional Imposition, supra note 4. For the first two fully argued ver-
sions of the diversity explanation, see William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction
Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983) [hereinafter
Fletcher, Historical Interpretation], and John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889 (1983), and see also
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987), William A.
Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989), Vicki C.Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988), James E. Pfander, History and State
Suability: An "Explanatory"Account of the Eleventh Amendment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269
(1998), and Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling Hans
v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1260 (1990).
38 See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REV. 1342 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh
Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HAuv. L. REv. 1372 (1989); Calvin R. Massey,
State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 61 (1989).
39 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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foreign countries.41 The Amendment bars a suit not only in law and
equity, but also in admiralty.42 And the Amendment bars a suit not
only in federal court, but also in state court.43 Further, although an
Eleventh Amendment defense can be waived by a state, the Amend-
ment "sufficiently partakes" of subject matter jurisdiction that a state
may assert an Eleventh Amendment defense for the first time on
appeal.44
Despite the breadth of the Amendment's bar, certain fictions per-
mit suits as a practical matter by defining "state" more narrowly for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment than for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. As a result of the modem Court's continuing
adherence to its 1890 decision in Lincoln County v. Luning,45 local gov-
ernments, including cities and counties, are not part of a state for
purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the action of a
local government is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Further, under Ex parte Young, as interpreted by
Edelman, a state officer sued for prospective (i.e., injunctive) relief
under federal law is not part of the state for purposes of the Eleventh
Amendment, even though the rationale for the suit is that the officer's
behavior was state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.46 Fi-
nally, a state officer may be sued individually for damages, at least
when the officer has committed a so-called "constitutional tort," even
though the rationale for the suit, as above, is that the officer's behav-
ior was state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.47
Under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,48 Congress may abrogate the protection
of the Eleventh Amendment altogether by clearly stating its intent to
do so and by passing a statute that is "appropriate legislation" under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 49 If Congress has abrogated
the Eleventh Amendment under Section 5, judicial remedies are not
limited to the prospective relief available under Ex parte Young and
40 See Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
41 See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
42 See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921). But see California v. Deep Sea
Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
43 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2266 (1999).
44 Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974).
45 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
46 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664.
47 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165-176 (1985); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 243 (1974).
48 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
49 It appears that Congress may also abrogate the 11th Amendment when legislat-
ing under Section 2 of the 15th Amendment. See City of Rome v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 (1980).
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Edelman or to damage relief against officers sued individually for con-
stitutional torts. Under Seminole Tribe, however, Congress may not ab-
rogate the protection of the Eleventh Amendment by passing a statute
under the Commerce Clause or other provisions of Article I of the
Constitution.
III. UNFINISHED BusINEss
Despite its prodigious work over the past quarter century, the
Court still has unfinished business. Some of it amounts to little more
than tidying up, filling in the spaces between already-decided cases.
But some of it is unfinished in a more fundamental sense, for some
important cases have yet to be decided, and others may have been
decided incorrectly. I will start with the small and work toward the
large.
First, the Court needs to clarify what it meant in Edelman in hold-
ing that an Eleventh Amendment defense may be raised for the first
time on appeal. Edelman is now commonly read (or misread) to mean
that the Amendment may be raised late in the proceedings before the
trial court or for the first time on appeal, without regard to whether it
could have been raised earlier and without regard to whether the
state's attorney had the power under state law to waive it. But under
Edelman, we should probably ask not only when the defense was first
asserted, but also by whom it was asserted. Edelman relied on Ford Motor
Co. v. Deparment of Transportation0 to support its holding that the de-
fense may be raised for the first time on appeal. Ford Motor Co. did
hold that the defense could be asserted for the first time on appeal,
but only because the state Attorney General, who had litigated the
case in the trial court, did not have the power to waive it. Indeed, Ford
Motor Co. stated explicitly that, if the Attorney General had had the
power under state law to waive the Eleventh Amendment, he would
have done so by failing to assert it in a timely fashion.
51
Second, the Court may wish to decide whether the states and
their local governments should be treated equally for purposes of the
50 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
51 See id. at 467. Justice Kennedy has recently raised this issue, arguing in a con-
currence in Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 393 (1998), that
a state may waive the 11th Amendment by removing a suit from state to federal court.
Indeed, Justice Kennedy would actually go further than Ford Motor Co. and would hold
that an attorney can waive the 11th Amendment by removing to federal court (or, by
extension, by failing to assert the 11th Amendment in a suit already in federal court),
irrespective of whether the attorney was specifically authorized under state law to
waive the Amendment. See id. at 397 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Hill v. Blind
Indus., 179 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1999) (adopting Justice Kennedy's approach).
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Eleventh Amendment Lincoln County v. Luning52 was based on an
early conception of a city (and, by extension, a local government) as a
corporation independent of the state,53 a conception that has survived
anachronistically in current Eleventh Amendment law. But assuming
equal treatment, we have to ask what form the equality would take.
Would the states' sovereign immunity come to look like that of local
governments-or vice versa? Though it is not clear that the current
Court would agree, there are plausible arguments for treating the
states the way local governments are now treated. Probably most im-
portant, it does not appear that local governments have been unrea-
sonably burdened under the current regime. Moreover, in those
instances where the distinction between state and local governments
has made a difference, it is hard to argue on grounds of policy that
those hanned by lawless state action under federal law should go with-
out remedy merely because they had the bad fortune to be harmed by
a state rather than a county.
It may be, however, that this question will prove to be of greater
theoretical than practical importance. As Professor Jeffries has
pointed out5 4 and as Professor Woolhandler has more recently
agreed, 55 at least for so-called "constitutional torts," the different theo-
retical treatment of states and local governments often is of little con-
sequence in the real world. Individual state and local officers both
may be enjoined to obey federal law, and both may be sued in their
individual capacities for damages for violations of federal law. Fur-
ther, state and local officers both may shield themselves from damage
suits based on a defense of qualified official immunity. Finally, it ap-
pears that both state and local governments, in all but the most ex-
treme cases, routinely defend and reimburse officers from whom
damages are recovered. 56 It is true that a local government may be
held directly liable for damages where the constitutional tort resulted
from official policy or from a systemic failure of the local government
to train its officers, and that a state government may not be held di-
rectly liable on the same basis.57 However, the barriers to direct recov-
ery of damages from a local government are fairly high, and the set of
52 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
53 See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 37, at 1101-07.
54 SeeJohn C. Jeffries, In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA.
L. REv. 47 (1998).
55 See Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property and Sovereign Immunity, 75
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 919 (2000).
56 SeeJeffiies, supra note 54, at 50 n.16.
57 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Owen v. City of Indepen-
dence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
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cases in which no damages are recoverable against an individual of-
ficer because of official immunity, but in which there is, at the same
time, damage liability against the local government employing that of-
ficer, is very small.58 In other words, even if this business remains un-
finished, it may not be critical that the Court finish it any time soon.
Third, the Court has begun to suggest that the power to enjoin
state officials under Ex Parte Young is not uniform for violation of all
federal laws. In Seminole Tribe, the Court refused to allow an injunc-
tion that would have required state officers to follow the federal In-
dian Gaming Regulatory Act, and in Coeur d'Alene the Court refused to
allow a federal court to hear a suit contesting title to real property that
would have resulted, if the tribe had prevailed on the merits, in an
injunction against state officers. The open question is whether the
Court will make further inroads into Ex parte Young. Until the Court's
decisions in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene, most observers would
have said that the Exparte Youngprinciple did not differentiate among
federal laws; indeed, Edelman, the central modern case affirming the
availability of injunctive remedies under Ex parte Young, hinted at no
such differentiation. In fact, however, Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene
should not have come as a great surprise, for nineteenth-century liti-
gation under the Contracts Clause indicates fairly clearly that there is
a difference among federal laws. In re Ayers59 and related cases consist-
ently held that the Contracts Clause cannot be enforced by injunc-
tion. I believe that these cases are still good law, based on the
traditional principle of sovereign immunity that an unconsenting sov-
ereign cannot be judicially compelled to pay its contractual obliga-
tions. Professor Jaffe described this principle as lying at the heart of
sovereign immunity, and I see no sign that the Court is likely to disa-
gree. 60 How much farther the Court will go, I do not know; but it
does not seem to me analytically wrong to conclude that remedies,
even injunctive remedies, may be different depending on the underly-
ing substantive legal obligation. In most instances, an injunction-
even an affirmative injunction-is likely to be an appropriate, perhaps
indispensable, remedy, but this does not mean that this must be so in
all instances.
Fourth, and finally, the Court has more work to do in defining
the scope of congressional power to abrogate the protection of the
58 See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (finding no basis for
damages liability against the employing municipality where there has been no consti-
tutional violation by an individual officer).
59 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
60 See Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HAv. L. REV. 1, 29 (1963).
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Eleventh Amendment. One way to understand this last piece of busi-
ness is to view it merely as tidying up after Seminole Tribe. This is how
the current Court appears to view it, and the Court is now working its
way through a laundry list of federal statutes, deciding whether they
are passed as "appropriate legislation" under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, or whether they are passed under Article I. Even
on this view of the matter, however, there is a needed clarification of
the Court's opinion in Seminole Tribe. I believe that the Court should
probably not be taken literally when it says in Seminole Tribe that Con-
gress entirely lacks power under Article I to abrogate the protection of
the Eleventh Amendment. 61 If Congress acts under the Spending
Clause of Article I, specifically and clearly giving a state money in ex-
change for a waiver of the state's sovereign immunity, the state's
waiver should have binding consequence. Perhaps the current Court
will get around its apparent meaning in Seminole Tribe by saying it in
exactly this way-that is, by saying that such action under the Spend-
ing Clause is not an example of abrogation under Article I, which is
forbidden, but of waiver, which is permitted.
Another way to understand this last piece of business, however, is
to say that the task is more than merely tidying up after Seminole Tribe.
As a number of commentators, including Professor Jackson, 62 have
argued, the task instead is to overrule Seminole Tribe. I believe that the
decision is a mistake not only from the viewpoint of the four consis-
tent dissenters on Eleventh Amendment issues. It is also at least a
partial mistake from the viewpoint of the five Justices in the majority,
and I hope that they will eventually recognize the implications of their
own previously expressed views of federalism and state sovereignty.
I believe that there is at least as strong an argument in favor of
some version of Union Gas, the case overruled by Seminole Tribe, as in
favor of Fitzpatrick v. Biter. That is, there is as strong an argument in
favor of allowing Congress to provide for damage judgments against
the states under at least some statutes passed under the Commerce
Clause (and under the Patent and Copyright Clauses) as under stat-
utes passed under the Fourteenth Amendment. I do not mean to say
that Fitzpatrick was wrongly decided; quite the opposite, for the argu-
ments in favor of Fitzpatrick are quite compelling. The most familiar
(though somewhat simplistic) argument in favor of Fitzpatrick is chron-
61 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) ("The Eleventh
Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be
used to circumvent the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
62 See Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential
Evisceration ofEx Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rrv. 495 (1997); see also DanielJ. Meltzer,
The Seminole Decision and Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
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ological: the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted after the Eleventh,
and therefore the later must overrule the earlier (even though the
adopters of the Fourteenth Amendment had no way of knowing the
modem meaning attached to the Eleventh Amendment and even
though the post-incorporation Fourteenth Amendment embodies law
of which its adopters had no notion). But more fundamentally, the
Fourteenth Amendment embodies legal rights that, for reasons em-
bedded in our history, have turned out to be particularly well-suited to
federal protection and particularly ill-suited to state protection. The
text of the Fourteenth Amendment tells us this on its face, specifically
forbidding the states eo nomine from depriving persons of equal pro-
tection or due process. This understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment provides an overwhelming justification for Fitzpatrick.
Why, then, do I believe that the argument in favor of Union Gas-in
favor of some congressional abrogation under the Commerce
Clause-is just as strong?
First, an argument in favor of state sovereign immunity is power-
ful when a state performs its sovereign functions, especially its polic-
ing and other criminal justice functions. But this argument has little
or no force when a state engages in commercial activities. Unlike reg-
ulation under the Fourteenth Amendment, regulation under the
Commerce, Patent, and Copyright Clauses generally does not regulate
a state in the performance of its sovereign functions. The Fourteenth
Amendment names the states, as states, and specifically directs them
to behave in certain ways. By contrast, the Commerce, Patent, and
Copyright Clauses do not name the states, and legislation passed
under these clauses is virtually always directed at private actors, and
brings a state within its scope only because the state engages in the
same behavior as the private actors.
The Supreme Court's cases dealing with statutes passed under
the Commerce, Patent, and Copyright Clauses form a revealing pat-
tern. In Parden v. Terminal Railway6 and Hilton v. South Carolina Public
Railways Commission,64 decided under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act,65 the state owned and operated railroads; in Alden,66 decided
under the Fair Labor Standards Act,6 7 the state employed workers; in
Union Gas,68 decided under CERCLA,69 the state owned polluted
63 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
64 502 U.S. 197 (1991).
65 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
66 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
67 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
68 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989).
69 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
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land; in Florida Prepaid,70 decided under the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act,71 the state allegedly infringed a
patent; and in College Savings Bank,72 decided under the Trade-Mark
Act of 1946 (the Lanham Act),73 the state allegedly engaged in false
and misleading advertising. In a case that has not yet made it to the
Supreme Court and whose name we do not yet know, but that will be
decided under the federal Copyright Act, the state may have violated a
copyright.
With the possible exception of a state deciding how much to pay
its employees, the actions of a state in these cases are not the actions
of a sovereign. Rather, they are actions of a state engaging in behav-
ior indistinguishable from that of a private commercial actor. The
distinction between sovereign actions and commercial actions ought
to be critical to Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, but, at the mo-
ment, it is not. If the Court really believes that the distinction is unim-
portant, we need to rethink a number of important legal ideas.
Perhaps most obvious, those Justices in the current majority who voted
for National League of Cities v. Usery74 need to rethink their rationale in
that case. Those Justices cannot simultaneously subscribe to the ra-
tionale in National League of Cities and the results in the recent Elev-
enth Amendment cases, for the holding in National League of Cities
depends on the distinction between activities of a state that involve its
sovereignty and activities that do not. Further, if the commercial ac-
tivities of the states are protected as activities of sovereigns, we need to
rethink the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 75 which, as Professor
Jackson points out,76 does not give sovereign immunity protection to
commercial activities of foreign states. Still further, if the commercial
activities of the states are the activities of sovereigns, the Court needs
to rethink the market participant doctrine under the dormant Com-
merce Clause, under which a state is allowed to favor its own residents
only when it is engaged in commercial activities. 77 Finally, the Court
needs to rethink its decision this Term in Reno v. Condon,78 sustaining
70 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2202-03 (1999).
71 35 U.S.G. § 271, 296 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
72 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2222 (1999).
73 15 U.S.C. § 1051-1127 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
74 426 U.S. 833
75 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1994).
76 See Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and Constitu-
tional Compromise, 31 RUTGERS. L.J. (forthcoming 2000).
77 See, e.g., South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
78 120 S. Ct. 666, 672 (2000) ("IT]he DPPA does not require the States in their
sovereign capacity to regulate their own citizens. The DPPA regulates the States as
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a federal law forbidding a state from selling information obtained
from drivers' licenses on the ground that it was commercial activity.
This is not to say that all statutes passed under the Commerce,
Patent, and Copyright Clauses should necessarily abrogate the Elev-
enth Amendment. In particular, the reach of the Commerce Clause is
so great that some state activity reached by some statutes passed under
the Commerce Clause would have a plausible claim to be protected
sovereign activity. For the current Court, the federal Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act is a statute that reaches such activity,79 as is
the Fair Labor Standards Act. But even this Court cannot claim seri-
ously that negligent operation of a state-owned railroad, or a patent
violation by a revenue-generating arm of a state university, is an activ-
ity traditionally protected by sovereign immunity.
Second, federal judicial remedies against state actors under the
Fourteenth Amendment-even in the absence of Fitzpatrick and con-
gressional abrogation of the Amendment-are substantial and in
most cases sufficient. As Professor Jeffries has recently argued, the Ex
parte Young!Edelman limitation of remedies may, paradoxically, make
the Fourteenth Amendment a more, rather than less, effective tool
against abuses of individual rights by the states. Under the current
regime, the Supreme Court is encouraged to adopt new Fourteenth
Amendment rules because, at least initially, they impose prospective
obligations through injunctions rather than retroactive obligations
through damages.80 Only after the rule is well-established are dam-
ages available; that is, damages are available against officers sued in
their individual capacities who commit constitutional torts only to the
extent that the rules have become clear and well-known and to the
extent that official immunity is therefore not available as a defense.81
But Professor Jeffries's argument concerning the sufficiency of
remedies for constitutional torts does not apply to a state's commer-
cial activity. Under the Ex parte Young!Edelman remedial scheme, no
damages are available against a state officer who, even though sued
individually, has not committed a constitutional tort but has merely
violated the commands of a statute like CERCLA or the Lanham Act.
the owners of databases.... The DPPA regulates the universe of entities that partici-
pate as suppliers to the market for motor vehicle information-the States as initial
suppliers of the information in interstate commerce and private resellers or redisc-
losers of that information in commerce.").
79 See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000).
80 SeeJohn C. Jeffries, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87
(1999).




In such a case, when a federal statute regulates commercial behavior
of private parties along with the identical behavior of state parties,
there is nothing unfair or economically perverse in requiring a state
to behave in as law-abiding a fashion as a private party, and in requir-
ing a state to compensate those harmed by its illegal behaviorjust as a
private party is required to do.
I confess, however, that there is a silver lining (so to speak). As
the law now stands, of the participants in this Symposium, Professor
Pfander, Professor Jefflies, and I can sell xeroxed course readers to
our students without paying royalties to the authors and without fear
of damage judgments because we teach at state law schools. Profes-
sorsJackson, V5zquez, and Woolhandler cannot, because they teach at
private law schools. This is an argument in favor of teaching at state
schools. It is also, in a nutshell, the argument against Seminole Tribe.
In sum, federal statutes regulating commercial behavior under
the Commerce, Patent, and Copyright Clauses affect the states where
they are acting least like states and where they consequently have the
weakest claim to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. In other words, in overruling Union Gas, the Court forbade
Congress to impose damage judgments on the states in precisely those
areas where Congress has the strongest claim to impose such damage
judgments without impinging on state sovereignty.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Alden last spring,
the diversity explanation of the Eleventh Amendment has finally
ceased to matter. When the Court decided in that case that the
Amendment is not just a forum-choice provision and that state sover-
eign immunity has the same force in both state and federal court, it
cut the last tie between its Eleventh Amendment case law and the text
of the Amendment. As a result, while Professor Pfander's elegant
work on the diversity explanation continues to be important intellec-
tually,8 2 it no longer makes a difference to the outcome of the cases.
All the Justices now accept the diversity explanation or its conse-
quences. Only the four dissentingJustices actually accept the explana-
tion, but the five Justices in the majority might as well have. That is,
all nine Justices have abandoned any thought, or any pretense, that
the text of the Eleventh Amendment matters. For the four Justices in
the minority, the text has a meaning they are willing to follow; but
because of the way they understand it, the text has no bearing on the
82 See Pfander, supra note 37.
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questions of federalism with which the Court is now struggling. For
the five Justices in the majority, the text has a different meaning; but
they regard the questions of federalism with which the text deals as
too important to be governed by the text.
For both groups of Justices, the fundamental question is the
meaning of state sovereign immunity in the federal structure, without
regard to the text of the Amendment. As Justice Kennedy wrote last
spring in Alden, Eleventh Amendment immunity is a "convenient
shorthand but something of a misnomer." 3 Or, as Chief Justice
Hughes wrote sixty-six years ago in Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi,
"Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are postulates
which limit and control. '8 4 Or, as Justice Bradley wrote one hundred
ten years ago in Hans v. Louisiana, "The letter [of the Amendment] is
appealed to now.., as a ground for sustaining a suit brought by an
individual against a state.... It is an attempt to strain the Constitu-
tion and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of."8
5
In its fashion, the present Court has finally cleared away the text of
the Eleventh Amendment, as in their fashions the Courts before them
have done the same. But the Court's unfinished business, the hard
work of translating the Constitution into a workable federal structure,
remains.
83 Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999).
84 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
85 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
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